ON ECLECTICISM
In chapters 2 through 4, GTC discusses eleven different research traditions and theories that constitute the antecedents and affinities of R-A theory. Foss (2000) finds these efforts to be "overly eclectic," lacking "clear selection criteria," and a "tapestry of diverse insights." Similarly, Savitt (2000, 73) believes "the sewing together of ideas from many literatures has not provided the solid framework that is desired." On the other hand, Hodgson (2000, 69) reviews these chapters and finds them to be "excellent background reading," which "use the best of various heterodox approaches to the theory of industries and firms." For him, these chapters are "highly recommended" because the "core ideas are bold and important."
As "minor criticisms," Hodgson suggests that the eclecticism in these chapters could have been improved by including the works of Downie (1958) , Richardson (1960) , and Steindl (1952) .
In reply, Foss (2000) and Savitt (2000) apparently misunderstand how R-A theory was created and the purpose of GTC's devoting three entire chapters (out of ten) to those research traditions and theories that either preceded R-A theory or share some affinities (as well as disaffinities) with it. They apparently believe that the theory was developed by first reviewing all these traditions and theories and then "picking and choosing," without "clear selection criteria," portions of each tradition and theory to provide an "integrated," general theory. They are mistaken. All theories spring from their foundational premises. My coauthor, Robert Morgan, and I developed the foundational premises and structure (see GTC, chaps. 5 and 6) of R-A theory prior to our having detailed knowledge of most of the eleven traditions and theories (and prior to our even being aware of some of them).
It was only after our initial efforts at developing the foundations and structure of R-A theory that numerous scholarsincluding some strong critics-alerted us that the foundations and structure of the theory had parallels in diverse research traditions. After reviewing them, we believed that academic honesty demanded that we acknowledge how the eleven theories and traditions are similar to, but not the same as, R-A theory. Again, R-A theory is the product of (1) a specific (and
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To have one's work evaluated by respected scholars in industrial economics, institutional economics, and marketing, respectively, is gratifying. To have such descriptors as "important," "compelling," "full of important insights," "challenging," "comprehensive," "bold and important," "extensive and valuable," "clear and suasive," and "much like classical treatises in economics such as Ludwig von Mieses' . . . or Alfred Marshall's" applied to A General Theory of Competition by such distinguished scholars is humbling. I appreciate their constructive comments and thank Andreas Falkenberg and JMM for offering me an opportunity to reply. parsimonious) set of foundational premises and (2) a specific structure. If close attention to issues of academic honesty is GTC's major shortcoming, it is one I gladly acknowledge.
To buttress his view that R-A theory is a "tapestry, " Foss (2000, 67) notes that it produces five predictions about growth that directly contradict neoclassical growth theory, and he questions whether one needs "eleven different theories and research traditions to arrive at these predictions." His answer is "surely not," and he states that evolutionary economics and institutional theory "will suffice." Three comments are in order here. First, R-A theory's premises and structure make the five predictions, not the "eleven different theories and research traditions." Second, Foss simply states that extant evolutionary economics and institutional theory "will suffice"; he does not demonstrate that they do so. And third, even if it could be demonstrated that simply combining extant evolutionary economics with institutional theory would make these five predictions, note carefully that Foss neither shows that (1) these theories have been combined to do so nor (2) that such a combination would have the total explanatory and predictive power-as enumerated in the concluding section of this reply-of R-A theory.
In conclusion, GTC develops a theory, not a tapestry. I maintain that no combination of extant evolutionary economics and institutional theory would have the explanatory and predictive power of R-A theory. Indeed, it could be argued that the present state of evolutionary economics and other heterodox approaches to competition are tapestries that desperately need a foundational theory. Perhaps GTC should be considered? Foss (2000) argues that the "main problem" of GTC is that to "the mainstream economist, theoretical development is inherently incremental." Indeed, "nobody takes theoretical leaps the size of those Hunt wishes to take" (p. 67). In contrast, not only does Hodgson (2000) find that "the core ideas are bold and important," but Savitt (2000, 75) argues that GTC is too incremental: "its weakness [is] in the conscious effort to build his theory primarily within the general paradigm of economic theory." Savitt suggests developing "a theory of competition that includes the competitive behaviors of consumers, not simply organizational ones, but ultimate consumers as well" (p. 75). Such a theory, he believes, should start with "Alderson's sorting process" and would require the construction of a completely "new lexicon . . . to clarify and define concepts" (p. 74).
ON INCREMENTALISM
In reply, I certainly agree with Foss (2000) that GTC does not represent a small, incremental step toward understanding the concept of competition and its role in market-based economies. Foss seems to be concerned not with the truth content of GTC but whether it will be rejected out-of-hand by mainstream economics. Indeed, he wonders "who is intended as the audience for this book" (p. 66). Two thoughts are relevant here. First, though some mainstream economists have been hostile to R-A theory, others have found it to be a significant step toward bridging the gap between process-oriented and equilibrium economics. Indeed, mainstream economics journals have published works on R-A theory (e.g., Hunt 1997b). Second, the target market for GTC is all those interested in understanding the nature of competition in market-based economies, be they in marketing, management, finance, accounting, economic sociology, mainstream economics, evolutionary economics, "Austrian" economics, institutional economics, socioeconomics, or-yes-business. So far, individuals and/ or journals in all these areas have expressed interest in GTC.
My reply to Savitt's (2000) complaint that GTC did not develop a completely new lexicon and new theory that incorporated Alderson's "sorting" and the competitive behaviors of consumers is simple: I do not know how to develop the lexicon and the theory he proposes. Nonetheless, GTC does include (in Figure 6 .1) the behaviors of consumers as an important factor that influences the process of competition among firms. I see no reason why the competitive behaviors of consumers, as well as the "sorting" aspects of Alderson, could not be incorporated in a systematic manner into the theory's lexicon and overall framework. I encourage him and others to work at doing so. As Hodgson (2000, 69) points out, "There is much more work to be done."
ON NEOCLASSICISM
At the same time that Foss (2000) criticizes GTC for being overly eclectic, he also complains that it "does not include mainstream economics." Because GTC often contrasts R-A theory with perfect competition, he worries that many economists will react with "angry surprise to the almost complete identification of neoclassical economics with the perfect competition model." In contrast, Savitt (2000) "kept on wishing that Hunt had let go of much of the [neoclassical] economic foundation he uses." In particular, he finds "substantial fault in moving toward a theory that is based on 'disequilibrium-provoking' premises because it implicitly accepts equilibrium." He argues that GTC should "theorize de nova." For Savitt, "competition has a number of meanings and research traditions," and even an economist colleague of his did not immediately associate "assume competition" with "assume perfect competition."
In reply, two comments are in order. First, as argued for extensively by Nelson and Winter (1982) , the theory of perfect competition does dominate discussions of competition in neoclassical economics. Indeed, the Journal of Economic Issues (JEI) insisted that I change the subtitle of Hunt (1997c) from "An Evolutionary Theory of Competition" to "An Evolutionary Theory of Competitive Firm Behavior." Why? Because JEI-an institutional economics journal-insisted that economists so strongly associate "competition" with perfect competition that identifying the theory as a theory of competition would confuse readers. Because perfect competition theory not only dominates neoclassical journals and texts (i.e., all of mainstream economics) but also exerts a powerful influence on allied areas, I believe it both necessary and appropriate to use the foundational premises of perfect competition as a starting point for communicating the foundations of R-A theory.
The preceding notwithstanding, I offer the following invitation-or, in Savitt's (2000) terms, "lay down the gauntlet"-to all those who believe that R-A theory should be compared with some other theory: identify the foundational premises of the theory of competition that you believe R-A theory should be compared against and place them side by side with those in GTC's Table 5 .1. Next, articulate the structure of the rival theory and compare it with the structure of GTC's Figure 6 .1. Then we can debate. It is only by comparing rival foundational premises and structures that one can clearly evaluate how and why theories are consistent or inconsistent, are saying different things or saying the same things differently, and are genuinely rival or actually complementary.
Second, as to Savitt's (2000) complaint that GTC is too neoclassical and his suggestion to "let go" of concepts such as equilibrium, GTC does encourage readers to expunge such neoclassical concepts as "rent seeking," "imperfect competition," and "utility" from discussions of competition. Furthermore, GTC urges scholars not to assume (as do mainstream economists and the comment by Foss [2000] ) that perfect competition is an "ideal state." Nonetheless, GTC acknowledges-as it should-that there are times when some industries and some industry groupings appear to be in a condition of stasis or equilibrium. Sometimes, there appears to be a lack of innovation and dynamism in an industry. R-A theory points out that if there is competition (i.e., R-A competition), such market failure periods of stasis are inherently unstable. This is because the process of competition is disequilibrium provoking or stasis disrupting. Therefore, throwing out "equilibrium" would be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
ON RESOURCES
Hodgson (2000) maintains that GTC's concept of resources is "both too general and too vague." He argues that it "makes no distinction between resources of one species and those of another" (p. 70). Drawing on the work of Veblen (1919) , he distinguishes "between human labor, skills, or knowledge, on one hand, and material capital goods, on the other" (p. 70). His Table 1 further notes that some skills and equipment are "readily tradable" and others are "less readily tradable." He then draws certain inferences from Table 1 and argues that GTC "fails to note the implications of distinguishing between different types of resources in the above manner" (p. 71).
In reply, as to distinguishing among resources, Table 5 .1 in GTC specifically distinguishes among financial, physical, legal, human, organizational, informational, and relational resources. Under physical resources, examples given are plant, raw materials, and equipment. Under human resources, examples given are the skills and knowledge of individual employees. And under informational resources, examples given are knowledge about market segments, competitors, and technology. Furthermore, a key point of R-A theory is that firm resources are substantially heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile, whereas "imperfectly mobile" resources are those not commonly, easily, or readily bought or sold in the marketplace (see section 5.5.1 of GTC).
As the preceding paragraph shows, the distinctions made in Hodgson's (2000) Table 1 , far from being absent in GTC, are specifically made and emphasized in GTC. Imperfectly mobile resources are precisely those identified by Hodgson as "less readily tradable." The categories of skills and equipment are specifically enumerated, in detail, in GTC. Furthermore, Hodgson's discussion of Veblen's (1919) work does not differentiate it from GTC. Indeed, GTC's section 4.2.1, titled "Institutional Economics," specifically discusses the work of Veblen and its parallels with R-A theory.
Finally, readers should note that although Hodgson (2000) provides a (partial) taxonomy of resources, he provides no definition of the concept "resource." For GTC, a resource is any tangible or intangible entity available to the firm that enables it to produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has value for some market segment(s). What kind of definition of resource does Hodgson's taxonomy imply? One suspects that any definition that can accommodate the specific kinds of resources that Hodgson identifies would look much like the definition in GTC. If so, on what grounds is it appropriate to consider "skills" and "knowledge" to be resources but not such "too general" entities as organizational policies and competences, as well as such "relational" resources as strategic alliances? It is doubtful that such grounds exist.
In conclusion, Hodgson (2000) has not shown that GTC's definition of resource is too general. Rather, his own typology of resources requires a definition much like that in GTC. Furthermore, Hodgson's typology of resources does not distinguish it from R-A theory. Rather, GTC specifically incorporates his typology-and much more. Indeed, it appears that Hodgson's work on resources requires an underlying competitive framework. Perhaps GTC should be considered?
ON "AUSTRIANISM"
As an "example of possibly claiming too much," Hodgson (2000, 72) maintains that GTC "asserts that resource-advantage theory explains the superiority of the capitalist market system over centrally planned economies such as of the former Soviet Union." Although he agrees that GTC shows the "fatal weakness" of defenders of socialist theory, "resource-advantage theory adds nothing new to standard Austrian analysis." Indeed, "resource-advantage simply replicates Austrian arguments" (p. 72).
In reply, GTC certainly discusses "Austrian" economics as an antecedent and affinity in sections 2.2, 7.2, and 7.3.2. Furthermore, GTC shows precisely how R-A competition is compatible with the standard, "Austrian" explanation of the deficiencies of command economies in section 7.3.5:
Because R-A theory is an evolutionary, process theory in which the constructs of "firm" and "competition" incorporate the institution of private property, the process of R-A competition results in prices of capital goods that tend to reflect opportunity costs and, hence, make economic calculation (in the Austrian sense) efficient in allocating scarce, tangible resources. Command economies, in contrast, by lacking the institutions of capitalism, lacked the marketplace-determined prices required for the efficient allocation of scarce, tangible resources. (Hunt 2000b, 175) However, two points are worth noting. Contra the claim of Hodgson (2000), GTC does not claim to explain the superiority of market-based economies. Rather, as section 7.3.5 puts it, "R-A theory contributes to explaining the superior productivity of market-based economies" (italics added). Indeed, the penultimate paragraph in this section is the following:
Lest there be any misunderstanding, it is important to keep in mind what is being argued here. It is not being argued that R-A theory, by itself, can explain the collapse of the command economies, for that resulted from a constellation of social, political, and economic factors. What is being argued here is that R-A theory is a theory of competition that can contribute to explaining and, therefore, understanding the factors that depressed the productivity of the command economies, when compared with their market-based counterparts. On this issue, perfect competition theory has "little or nothing to say" (Knight 1936, p. 255) . (Hunt 2000b, 176) Second, the "Austrian" economic calculation argument is only one of four different grounds that GTC argues as contributing to explaining why market-based economies have superior productivity. The other three arguments, detailed in section 7.3 of GTC, are different from the "calculation" argument in that they focus on such issues as efficiency-enhancing innovation, effectiveness-enhancing innovation, financial performance as indicating marketplace positions, and the creation of new resources. These three arguments do not "simply replicate Austrian arguments." CONCLUSION I wish to thank again the three commentators for taking the time to read and provide critiques of GTC. Given that Hodgson (2000) maintains that it claims "too much," readers might be interested in knowing, more specifically, what GTC asserts. The claims made in GTC are that R-A theory does the following:
• contributes to explaining firm diversity (section 6.3);
• makes the correct prediction concerning financial performance diversity (section 6.3.1); • contributes to explaining observed differences in quality, innovativeness, and productivity between market-based and command-based economies (section 7.3); • shows why competition in market-based economies is dynamic (section 5.7.1); • incorporates the resource-based view of the firm (section 4.1.5); • incorporates the competence view of the firm (sections 2.1.3 and 4.1.5); • has the requisites of a phylogenetic, nonconsummatory, and disequilibrium-provoking theory of competition (section 2.1.3); • explicates the view that competition is a process of knowledge discovery (sections 2.2.3 and 6.1.4); • contributes to explaining why social relations constitute a resource only contingently (section 4.2.4); • has the requisites of a moderately socialized theory of competition (section 4.2.4); • shows how path dependence effects can occur (sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5); • expands the concept of capital (section 8.2.1);
• predicts correctly that technological progress dominates the K/L (i.e., capital/labor) ratio in economic growth (section 8.3); • predicts correctly that increases in economic growth cause increases in investment (section 8.4); • predicts correctly that most of the technological progress that drives economic growth stems from the actions of profit-driven firms (section 8.5); • predicts correctly that R-A competition can prevent the economic stagnation that results from capital deepening (section 8.6); • contributes to explaining the growth pattern of the (former) Soviet Union (section 8.6.1); • provides a theoretical foundation for why formal institutions promoting property rights and economic freedom also promote economic growth (section 9.2); • provides a theoretical foundation for why informal institutions promoting social trust also promote economic growth (section 9.3.3); • has the requisites of a general theory of competition that incorporates perfect competition as a limiting special case, thereby incorporating the predictive successes of neoclassical theory and preserving the cumulativeness of economic science (section 10.1); • shows why the debate over antitrust legislation and implementation has been so misguided (section 10.2.2); and • provides some-preliminary, to be sure-recommendations for public policy (section 10.3).
It is heartening to note that none of the three commentaries provides convincing argument or evidence that any claim in the preceding list is unwarranted. Nonetheless, R-A theory is
